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Hearing the difference between a patriarchal voice and a relational 
voice defines a paradigm shift: a change in the conception of the human world. 
Theorizing connection as primary and fundamental in human life leads to a 
new psychology, which shifts the grounds for philosophy andpolitical theory. A 
crucial distinction is made between a feminine ethic of care and a feminist ethic 
of care. Voice, relationship, resistance, and women become central rather than 
peripheral in this reframing of the human world. 
Kew words: Patriarchal voice, relational voice, connection, feminine 
ethic, feminist ethic, resonance. 
El hecho de escuchar la diferencia entre una voz patriarcal y una voz 
relacional define un cambio de paradigma: un cambio en la concepción del 
mundo humano. Teorizar la vinculación como un aspecto primordial yfunda- 
mental de la vida humana conduce a una nueva psicologia que modzpca el te- 
rreno en el que operan lajlosofía y la teoria política. Se establece una distin- 
ción decisiva entre una ética femenina y una ética feminista del cuidado. La 
palabra, la relación, la resistencia y las mujeres adquieren un lugar central, en 
vez de perife'rico, en esta reforinulación del mundo humano. 
Palabras clave: voz patriarcal, voz relacional, vinculación, ética femeni- 
na, ética feminista, resonancia. 
When I began the work that led to Zn a Different Voice (1982), the framework 
was invisible. To study psychology at that time was like seeing a picture without 
seeing the frame, and the picture of the human world had become so large and all- 
encompassing that it looked like reality or a rnirror of reality, rather than a representa- 
tion. It was starling then to discover that women for the most part were not included 
in research on psychological development, or when included were marginalized or 
interpreted within a theoretical bias where the child and the adult were assumed to be 
male and the male was taken as the norm. 
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Bringing women's voices into psychology posed an interpretive challenge: 
how to listen to women in women's terms, rather than assimilating women's voices to 
the existing theoretical framework. And this led to a paradigm shift. Men's discon- 
nection from women, forrnerly construed as the separation of the self from relation- 
ships, and women's dissociation from parts of themselves, formerly interpreted as 
women's selflessness in relationships, now appeared problematic. Framed within an 
ethic of care, disconnections and dissociations which had been taken as foundational 
to conception of self and morality appeared instead to be careless and harmful. This 
is what I meant by a different voice, on a theoretical level. 
It is said that a tuning fork, tuned to a particular pitch, will stop the vibrations 
in eight or nine others that are tuned to a different frequency (Noel 1995). Listening 
to human voices, Noel finds that one voice, speaking in a particular emotional regis- 
ter can stop the emotional vibrations in a group of people so that the environment in 
the room becomes deadened or flat. When this happens, she observes, it looks like 
silence but in fact the feelings and thoughts -the psychological energy- often move 
into the only place they can still live, and vibrate in silence, in the inner sense, unti1 it 
becomes possible to bring them back into the world (Noel 1995). 
I began writing about a different voice when I heard what George Eliot called 
the crstill, small voice>> speaking in a different psychological register. The voice that 
set the dominant key in psychology, in political theory, in law and in ethics, was keyed 
to separation: the separate self, the individual acting alone, the possessor of natural 
rights, the autonomous moral agent. Because the paradigmatic human voice conve- 
yed this sense of separation as foundational, it was difficult to hear connection wi- 
thout listening under the conversation. 
I was listening at the time to women who were pregnant and thinking about 
abortion in the immediate aftemath of the Roe v. Wade decision. Women's concerns 
were often driven by experiences of disconnection which rendered relationships diffi- 
cult to maintain, but their voices canied a sense of connection, of living and acting in 
a web of relationships which went against the grain of the prevailing discourse of 
indlividual rights and freedom. Speaking of connection, of responsiveness and respon- 
sibility in relationships, women heard themselves sounding either selfish or selfless, 
because the opposition of self and other was so pervasive and so powerfully voiced in 
the public discourse. It was as if women's experience of connection was unnatural, 
unhealthy or unreal. But it was also ironic, because the Supreme Court had given 
woimen a legal voice in a matter of relationship and at the same time had framed that 
voice within a discourse of rights which made it impossible to speak about relations- 
hip, except in terms of justice -equality, fairness, reciprocity- or in terms of contrac- 
tual obligation, neither of which had much bearing on many women's situation. In 
developing a different voice as a key to a new psychology and politics, I found that 
huiman voices and also relationship became more resonant and more vibrant. 
On a theoretical and political level, on a personal and psychological level, this 
change in voice seemed essential. The existing paradigm was patriarchal; it was built 
on a disconnection from women which became part of the psychology of women and 
men. Theories of psychological and political development took this separation as 
foundational to the development of a sense of self, and as a result, the separate self 
and the selfless woman -the artifacts of a patriarchal psychology and politics -appea- 
rec1 natural and inevitable, necessary and good. 
I come then to a crucial distinction: the difference between a feminine ethic of 
care and a feminist ethic of care. Care as a feminine ethic is an ethic of special obliga- 
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tions and interpersonal relationships. Selflessness or self-sacrifice is built into the very 
definition of care when caring is premised on an opposition between relationships and 
self-development. A feminine ethic of care is an ethic of the relational world as that 
world appears within a patriarchal social order: that is, as a world apart, separated poli- 
tically and psychologically from a realm of individual autonomy and freedom which is 
the realm of justice and contractual obligation. 
A feminist ethic of care begins with connection, theorized as primary and seen 
as fundamental in human life. People live in connection with one another; human 
lives are interwoven in a myriad of subtle and not so subtle ways. A feminist ethic of 
care reveals the disconnections in a feminine ethic of care as problems of relation- 
ship. From this standpoint, the conception of a separe self appears intrinsically pro- 
blematic, conjuring up the image of rational man, acting out of relationship with the 
inner and outer world. Such autonomy, rather than being the bedrock for solving psy- 
chological and moral problems itself becomes the problem, signifying a disconnec- 
tion from emotions and a blindness to relationships which set the stage for psycholo- 
gical and political trouble. This reframing of psychology in terms of connection 
changes the conception of the human world; in doing so, it establishes the ground for 
a different philosophy, a different political theory, a change in ethics and legal theory. 
From this perspective, it becomes easier to see how the disconnection of the 
self from relationships and the separation of the public world from the private world 
define a realm of human activity which can only be maintained as long as someone 
cares about relationships, takes care of the private world and feels bound to other 
people. Historically this labor of caring has been the special obligation and unpaid 
labor of women, or the poorly paid labor of women who by virtue of class or caste 
difference are doubly excluded from the general domain of human freedom. Women 
living in patriarchal families, societies, and culture are bound internally and exter- 
nally by obligations to care without complaint, on pain of becoming a bad woman: 
unfeminine, ungenerous, uncaring. Following women's psychological development, I 
found that for a woman to free herself from these moral strictures generally involves 
undoing a process of psychological dissociation and retrieving a voice that has been 
driven into silence (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Rogers and Noel, 1992; Jack, 1991; Lin- 
klater, 1976). When this inner voice surfaces and comes into relationships, it sets off 
different vibrations and resonances. Then a discourse of relationship can replace the 
patriarchal construction of relationships. The tension between a relational psycho- 
logy and a patriarchal social order is caught by a paradox: living within the structures 
of patriarchy, women find themselves giving up relationship in order to have rela- 
tionships (Gilligan, 1990b; Gilligan n.d.b.; Miller, 1988). A feminist ethic of care 
became the voice of the resistance. 
This brings me to my central point. Theorizing connection as primary and fun- 
damental in human life directs attention to a growing body of supporting evidence 
which cannot be incorporated within the old paradigm. Studies of the infant as a mem- 
ber of a couple refute the depiction of the infant as locked up in egocentrism and pro- 
vide compelling data showing that the desire for relationship, pleasure in connection, 
and the ability to make and maintain relationship are present at onset of development. 
Research on women and girls provides evidence of psychological capacities and rela- 
tional knowledge that raises the most fundamental questions about the nature of cogni- 
tive and emotional and social development; otherwise, it would seem impossible that 
women and girls know what they know. These psychological studies of infants and 
women recast the understanding of the developmental process in relational terms; they 
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have relied on new research methods and they demonstrate the power of a relational 
approach in research as well as in psychotherapy (Murray and Trevarthen, 1985; Stern, 
1985; Tronick, 1989; Brown and Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Kreider, and 
O'Neill n.d.; Jordan et al., 1991; Miller and Stiver, 1994; Relke 1993). 
In History Aper Lacan, Brennan describes the ending of the ego's era. It began 
witlh the joining of the Cartesian self and capitalism in the seventeenth century. Bren- 
nan characterizes the separate self or the autonomous ego as a foundational fantasy 
which does not appear as a fantasy as long as the ego's omnipotence and control are 
socially constructed as reality, wrapping the imperial <<I>> in a cultural cocoon. 
<<To allow that my feelings physlcally enter you, or yours me, to think that we both had the 
same thought at te same time because it was literally in the air, is to think in a way that 
really puts the subjectin question. In some ways, the truly interesting thing is that this ques- 
tioning has begum (Brenan, 1993, p. 41). 
I arn interested in women's relationship to this societal and cultural transfor- 
mation because the history of this relationship is in danger of being buried. Listening 
to women's voices clarified the ethic of care, not because care is essentially associa- 
ted with women or part of women's nature, but because women for a combination of 
psychological and political reasons voiced relational realities that were otherwise 
unspoken or disrnissed as inconsequential. A patriarchal social order depends for its 
regeneration on a disconnection from women, which in women takes the form of a 
psychological dissociation: a process of inner division that makes it possible for a 
woman not to know what she knows, not to think what she thinks, not to feel what 
she feels. Dissociation cuts through experience and memory, and when these cuts 
become part of cultural history, women lose the grounds of their experience and with 
it, rheir sense of reality. 
In studies of girl's psychological development, my colleagues and I have wit- 
nessed the onset of dissociative processes at adolescence (Brown and Gilligan, 1992; 
Gilligan, Brown, and Rogers, 1990; Rogers, 1993). Girls at this time face a relational 
crisis or developmental impasse which has its parallel in the relational crisis of boy's 
early childhood. Freud called this crisis the Oedipus complex and theorized it as a 
turning point in psychological development, marking a definitive intersection betwe- 
en psychological development and the requisites of civilization. The resolution of the 
Oedipus Complex structures the connection between inner and outer worlds. 
I have come to theorize a similar crisis in girl's lives at adolescence as a crisis 
of voice and relationship, also marking a definitive joining between psychological 
development and civilization. This is the time when girls are pressed from within and 
without to take on the interpretive framework of patriarchy and to regulate their sexua- 
lity, their relationships, their desires and their judgments in its tems. As for boys in 
early childhood, this intemalization of a pahiarcha1 voice leads to a loss of relations- 
hip or a compromise between voice and relationships, leaving a psychological wound 
or scar. The asymmetry I have posited between boy's and girl's development finds 
coinfirmation in the considerable evidence showing that boys are more psychologi- 
cally at risk than girls throughout the childhood years and that girls' psychological 
strenghts and resilience are suddenly at risk in adolescence (see Gilligan n.d.a.; 
Debold, 1994). 
Girls' initiation into womanhood has often meant an initiation into a kind of 
selflessness, which is associated with care and connection but also with a loss of psy- 
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chological vitality and courage. To become selfless means to lose relationship or to 
lose one's voice in relationships. This loss of relationship leads to a muting of voice, 
leaving inner feelings of sadness and isolation. In effect, the young woman becomes 
shut up within herself. 
When the release of women's voices in the 1970s put an end to this house arrest 
and brought the disconnection from women out into the open, women revealed the 
startling omission of women from psychology and from history and also discovered 
the extent of women's dissociation: women's ignorance of their bodies, themselves 
and other women. The association of women with care became problematic for many 
women because when care is framed as a ethic of selflessness and self-sacrifice in 
relationships it enjoins these inner divisions in women and catches women in a psy- 
chological and political trap. Claiming human status, women brought themselves and 
their concerns about relationship into the public arena, placing high on the political 
agenda relationsips with children, family relationships, relationships with the envi- 
ronment, relationships with the future as developed through education and health 
care, and above all, the problem of violence in domestic as well as national and inter- 
national relationships. In this way, women reframed women's problems as human 
concerns. 
Any discussion of a care ethic, then, has to begin with the issue of framing. 
What is the framework within which we will compare and contrast justice and care? 
When I hear care discussed as a matter of special obligations or as an ethic of inter- 
personal relationships, I hear the vestiges of patriarchy. When I listen to care versus 
justice debated as if there was no framework, I hear the implicit patriarchal frame- 
work silently slipping back into place. 
In analyzing psychological theory and women's psychological development, I 
have attempted to show how a feminist ethic of care repudiates a feminine ethic of 
care on the grounds that a feminine ethic of care rests on a faulty notion of relations- 
hip. This fault erupts in women's lives in the form of a psychological crisis. A para- 
dox then becomes evident: women are <<doing ood and feeling bad>> (Miller, 1976); 
women are silencing themselves in order to be with other people; women are giving 
up relationship for the sake of having relationships, and then missing themselves and 
missing relationship or feeling stranded in a confusing isolation which is often filled 
with self-condemnation (Gilligan, 1977; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, 1990b; Jack, 1991; 
Miller, 1988; Miller, 1991; Stern, 1990). 
Hearing the difference between a patriarchal voice and a relational voice means 
hearing separations which have sounded natural or beneficial as disconnections which 
are psychologically and politically harrnful. Within a relational framework, the sepa- 
rate self sounds like an artifact of an outmoded order: a disembodied voice speaking 
as if from nowhere. In the absence of relational resonances, the exposure of an inner 
voice is psychologically dangerous because its openness to vibrations heightens vul- 
nerability. Hearing a relational voice as a new key for psychology and politics, I have 
theorized both justice and care in relational terms. Justice speaks to the disconnec- 
tions which are at the root of violence, violation and oppression, or the unjust use of 
unequal power. Care speaks to the dissociations which lead people to abandon them- 
selves and others: by not speaking, not listening, not knowing, not seeing, not caring 
and ultimately not feeling by numbing themselves or steeling themselves against the 
vibrations and the resonances which characterize and connect the living world. 
The talking cure or cure through relationship which Freud and Breuer discove- 
red to be so psychologically powerful and effective finds its analogue in the public 
Anuario de Psicologia, vol. 34, no 2, junio 2003, pp. 155-161 
O 2003, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
160 C. Gilligan 
areina which Arendt saw as essential to the health of a democratic society: a place 
where people can come and speak freely. The antidote to psychological repression is 
the antidote to totalitarianism. When a relational voice sets the key for psychology, 
political theory, law, ethics and philosophy, it frees the voices of women and men and 
also the voices of the disciplines from patriarchal strictures. 
Hope is a dangerous emotion because it creates such vulnerability to disap- 
pointment, and the process of change is never straightforward. The desire for rela- 
tionship may jeopardize relationships; the desire to speak will heighten vulnerability 
and. may lead to psychological ham. The psychological knowledge that has been gai- 
ned in the past quarter century provides a map for the resistance and a guide to rela- 
tionship, marking the pirfalls of disconnection and dissociation. However arduous the 
terrain and however conflicted the journey, however strong the pulls toward repetition 
and return, a different voice has been heard and a new direction charted. 
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